INTRODUCTION
A new, more responsive and personalized era in healthcare has long been anticipated.
For example, it could blur the boundaries between lab, clinic, innovation industries, and healthcare services, thereby inappropriately shifting research targets and measures of success; recreate the discourse patterns of other emerging technologies and practices, prompting speculative ethics, thereby squandering valuable ethical resources; 5 undermine existing regulatory structures aimed at key social (eg respect) and clinical (eg safety, efficacy) objectives, thereby weakening measures meant to ensure benefit; and contribute to regulatory construction, and so to overlap, confusion, and burden, thereby stifling innovation and promise. 6 And if our technical vision is achieved, it could exacerbate existing disparities in healthcare, both domestically and internationally, thereby moving us farther away from justice in health.
With respect to large-scale biobanking and data sharing, Nicol et al. correctly state that regulatory problems have been multiple, with consent looming large as an issue of concern. 7 Given that biobanks are part of a new research model that does not permit the effective functioning of traditional consent, 8 they have been met with significant ethical concern and regulatory construction, the result being a wave of policy statements, and normative claim making and standard setting. 9 Citing Collins and Varmus, 10 Nicol et al. state (p. 19), again correctly, that regulation must ensure that innovations are timely, widely affordable, safe, and effective. I contend that the notion of 'responsible research and innovation' (RRI) could contribute to these objectives, and, if used in combination with 'legal foresighting' (LF), could generate the evidence that is necessary to encourage better regulation (and decision making). Here, I briefly outline RRI and LF, arguing that they ought to facilitate the design of value-based regulation that is more 'future proof' than many examples on which we currently rely.
RRI AND LF
RRI is a broad and imprecise concept that has gained particular policy traction in Europe. 11 The notion of RRI grew out of earlier and ongoing discussions about research integrity relating to controversial technologies such as genomics, synthetic biology, and nanotechnologies, 12 as well as concerns about the value of science, 13 technology control in contexts of uncertainty and ignorance, 14 RRI has therefore been associated with calls for processes supportive of taking broader views of science, of instigating culture-change therein, and of forming collective imaginaries that begin from much wider frames than are currently permitted in reflective practices. 20 In other words, scenario building and other reflexive exercises must allow actors to think more deeply not only about potential products and outcomes, but also about the purpose of science and innovation, and how to achieve the correct impacts from innovation.
Importantly, research has resulted in a framework that might be used to think more critically about regulatory possibilities in settings characterized by uncertainty; the notion (and practice) of LF is meant to generate diverse evidence supportive of more effective and durable governance practices and instruments. 21 It draws inspiration from the conviction, expressed 20 years ago, that stunning achievements in life sciences necessitate 'lengthened foresight', not only because of the consequences they can have for future generations, but also because of the non-traditional forms of oppression 15 permitted by them (ie stemming from biological potentialities and relating to the often invisible distribution of life opportunities). 22 At base, LF is conceived as a futureoriented process aimed at identifying and exploring possible and desirable legal or quasilegal interventions directed at better achieving valued social and technological ends; it is concerned with how to improve the process of designing governance systems so that they might more effectively use regulation to achieve socially justified public goods. 23 The premises underlying LF are that, if we wish to better govern and operate in fluid and unstable settings (such as precision medicine), then we must:
1. accept that the law, though often limited and blunt, may properly play a significant role in articulating socio-technological objectives, in shaping behavior, and in measuring (and rectifying) the justness of outcomes, and can and should be more proactive and integral to the formation of new pathways of action; 2. reject the notion that past or existing uses of law represent good models, and be prepared to undertake a fundamental revisioning of the legal setting, its institutions, instruments, and mechanisms; and 3. generate quality evidence (intermittently or on an ongoing basis) through processes that help us to question positions, unpack assumptions, and make us think more creatively about the role of the law within the broader setting.
Regulators are reasonably well placed to be 'first movers' in this process, but a range of actors are also important 'carriers of agency', and can be rational initiators who not only enable development through regulation, but are able to prompt positive regulatory change through participative deliberation about regulation (which in turn brings about scientific and social change). Thus, LF relies on a wide range of actors so as to subject the technical field and its trajectories, together with social trends, and legal conditions, inertias and developments to early, rational, sober reflection, offering the participants a chance to help shape the future by creating pathways into the unknown through regulation. 24 This can be done through a range of mechanisms, including calls for evidence, participative workshops, citizen juries, DELPHI surveys, semistructured interviews, and structured scenario building, and indeed multiple methodologies are recommended. The key is that the effort is sustained and the process is collaborative; expert and lay actors (including non-traditional participants) collectively generate a better and more diverse evidence base in support of more robust and reflexive decision making, thereby better equipping decision makers to anticipate movements and design moral options for 22 Alastair T. Iles, Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights Framework, 9 HARV. HUM. RIGHTS J.
27 (1996), at 57. 23 This emphasis on legal innovation sets it apart from many other foresighting exercises; it is an exercise concerned with law in society, and with making the law more effective in its social operation and in its relationship with the object of its attention, in this case a dynamic, complex and uncertain science. 24 innovation (and the law) that are fit for purpose. So defined, it is clear that foresighting efforts in the legal sphere have been very few.
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So conceived, RRI imposes obligations on governments, regulators, and funders to expand dramatically the opportunities for early collaborative engagement around the purposes and directions of science and innovation, and to more explicitly build into research program processes for ongoing reflexivity around actions, obligations, outcomes, trajectories, and also law as a component of governance. In other words, it demands that they pay sustained attention, and offer ongoing and systematic support (read funding), so that actors from across diverse but complimentary fields (ie innovators, healthcarers, patients, IP experts, civil society actors, etc.) can come together on a regular basis to reflect on the field and how it is developing, and how it might develop differently.
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VALUE-BASED REGUL ATION
RRI processes, which could benefit from the LF framework, could and should lead to useful discussions around foundational values. As has been advocated elsewhere, 27 it is important for research undertakings, especially those expected to endure, to identify, and reflect broad values, which serve as signals to stakeholders and publics about what will inform actions and decisions (ie they are both descriptive and normative). While strongly risk-based and autonomy-based approaches have influenced existing structures and practices, a more solidarity-colored approach is warranted in the health research setting. On biobanks, Prainsack and Buyx have argued that:
A biobank reflective of [solidarity] would pursue assisting others as its main research goal; that is, the main activity of the biobank would always have to be research aiming to improve health of individuals or populations (or comparable, other-directed goals). In addition, transparency towards participants is required about how the goal of improving the health of individuals and populations relates to commercial goals. 28 Other values are also pertinent to this setting. Some have been espoused in the many international legal instruments that are applicable to biomedicine, 29 including scientific 25 The process of designing the LF framework was an example of partial operation (ie it was an evolving process in practice throughout our work in Argentina). For more on some of this work, see http://www.research. ed.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/governing-emerging-biotechnologies-social-values-and-stem-cellresearchregulation-in-argentina(77db2184-b88f-47b3-9281-e921ca91ffaf).html. 26 All of which imposes on researchers an obligation to take much more seriously their deliberative and engagement activities (ie to effectively integrate them into their research activities, and to pursue them genuinely and with a view to real reflexivity). 27 Harmon, supra note 8; Shawn H. E. Harmon freedom, 30 autonomy, 31 and safety. 32 Others, which were uncovered in the course of a two-year empirical project studying regenerative medicine in Argentina, 33 include the following.
First, with respect to values about society and the role of science generally, 'wellbeing', 'dignity', 'justice', and 'autonomy' have been cited as critical. Well-being acknowledges that social health and productivity depend on human health; it is important to protect life, health, and wellness, both physical and psychological, and to support actions that facilitate quality of life. Dignity recognizes the importance of respecting people (ie generating knowledge within moral bounds); while pushing boundaries and being creative is important, innovators must balance the research imperative with other values, being careful not to instrumentalize people. Justice refers to the fact that actors must ensure equality and equity, and must share fairly the benefits of research (ie the benefits of research must be made available and optimized). Finally, with respect to autonomy, individuals and communities desire to exercise free will, so creating space for people to make decisions about themselves and for themselves according to their values is important. This demands that stakeholders should be given adequate information so they can weigh options and make reasonably informed decisions, and be satisfied that agents will take reasonable steps to protect their personal information.
Values were also noted as having a particular importance to science and its governance. In this regard, 'integrity', 'transparency', 'engagement', and 'reflexivity' have been highlighted as important. On integrity, researchers must be honest with and about patients and subjects, and with research data. They must not promise to do one thing and then do another, and they must avoid hyperbole and inflated claims. As part of this, they must not put donors, research subjects, or patients at undue risk; researchers should be motivated by non-maleficence (a will to do no harm) and beneficence (an ambition to actively do good), and should avoid unnecessary risks, manage acceptable risks, and improve the quality of life of people. Transparency demands that innovators model comprehensible and open decision-making structures, and encourage information sharing in multiple directions by designing rational structures to manage resources that includes multidirectional communication strategies and periodic reviews of governance practices. Engagement acknowledges that participation and partnership are important. Good science needs more than well-meaning scientists; it requires open, pluralistic debate and idea exchange, and governance structures that encourage this while also providing boundaries. Innovators must therefore pursue ongoing communication with potential donors, participants, and the general public, encouraging participation in the resource, informing about general findings from research based on the resource, and responding to inquiries about the resource. To be reflexive, governance practices and strategies must evolve if they are to remain optimal. This demands both reflexivity and an iterative approach to both governance and practice mechanisms and processes. Innovators should therefore endeavor to undertake periodic reviews of their governance structures and practices to ensure that they are fit for purpose.
Of course, other values could be added to these, but the point is that they must be collaboratively identified and explored using a robust evidence-generating process (like LF within an RRI setting), and they must then be operationalized.
CONCLUSION
The importance of explicit governance frameworks to our ambitions for the good governance of science (and particularly biobanking) has been emphasized:
The benefit of governance is that it promotes certainty and efficiency as people know what the rules are, what happens, and when. It can ensure uniformity and equality-that things are done in a uniform way with everyone and the same issues being treated the same. Such a system enables problems to be anticipated as there are mechanisms to deal with the routine issues but unanticipated situations can also be resolved efficiently. Having a governance system in place ensures that ethical and lawful research is supported through accountable and transparent decision making. This not only protects the integrity of the research community but also has the effect of promoting public confidence and trust. 34 Unfortunately, it has also been found that the majority of existing and emerging biobanks fail to adopt a prospective governance strategy. 35 If we hope to achieve good governance for precision medicine-or for any other emerging practice characterized by convergence and uncertainty-then we must acknowledge that governance is enacted by many parties, including those who are themselves governed (ie innovators who are subject to external regulation also construct the governance setting applicable to them through their own standards and actions, their collaborative work with regulators, and the imaginaries and worldviews by which they shape their decisions). This demands new and sustained practices for thinking about governance. The notions of RRI and LF are examples of practices being theorized and put at least partially into operation, but examples of their integration are few, if any. This is lamentable. Perhaps our well-funded pursuits in precision medicine will help achieve the operationalization that we have been missing.
